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INTRODUCTION
People who are transgender and incarcerated face a unique set of
human rights challenges. Courts have made progress protecting trans-
gender people who are incarcerated by relying on the psychiatric diagno-
sis, Gender Dysphoria (GD), as grounds for legal protections. However,
reliance on a medical model of gender has practical limitations and ad-
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verse social consequences. This model fails to protect the most vulnera-
ble people of trans experience and contributes to stigma against the
transgender community overall. The social and legal interests of people
who are transgender and incarcerated would be better served if their
rights were protected on alternate legal grounds.
Part I will offer background on gender theory. First, this Note will
critique the binary system of gender. Next, this Note will discuss how the
medical establishment has reinforced the binary system of gender by
psycho-pathologizing gender transgression. Then, this Note will explain
how courts have solidified this medicalized binary system by relying on
the flawed assumption that transgender people inherently experience
mental illness.1 Finally, this Note will propose an alternate formulation
of gender, which prioritizes self-definition over medicalization.
Part II will apply this gendered framework to issues experienced by
transgender people who are incarcerated. First, this Note will describe
the disproportionate representation of transgender people in the criminal
justice system and offer several explanations for this disparity. Next, this
Note will discuss a variety of challenges faced by people who are trans-
gender and incarcerated and describe how the legal system has addressed
each issue. This Note will problematize legal reasoning that equates trans
experience with mental illness and will explore alternative legal remedies
that align with an inclusive and empowering conceptualization of gender.
I. GENDER IDEOLOGY
A. The Binary System of Gender
American society predominantly subscribes to a binary system of
gender.2 The binary system encompasses three main assumptions. First,
there are two sexes, male and female, which are dichotomous, mutually
exclusive categories.3 Second, there are two genders, man and woman,
which flow from the two sexes.4 Third, the norms associated with these
gender categories, masculinity and femininity, are at least partially the
product of biological characteristics, such as hormonal, anatomical, or
1 This Note does not intend to undermine or discredit important efforts to destigmatize
disability and mental illness. Rather, this Note expresses concern regarding misguided medical
and legal tactics that pathologize all transgender people by equating trans experience with
mental illness.
2 Miqqi Alicia Gilbert, Defeating Bi-genderism, 24 HYPATIA 93, 95 (2009) (“The main
thrust of the rules is to establish that there are two and only two genders, and that everyone
must be one or the other. This level of bigenderism is its basic form, and is not only a fact of
popular perception, but is largely official as well . . . . Governments, schools, hospitals, the
professions, the arts, and virtually all social institutions rely on basic bigenderism . . .”).
3 Patience W. Crozier, Forcing Boys to Be Boys: The Persecution of Gender Non-Con-
forming Youth, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 123, 125 (2001).
4 Id.
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evolutionary differences between men and women.5 Within the binary
system, people are assigned “male/man” or “female/woman” at birth
based on a doctor’s visual assessment of their external genitalia, then
socialized to exhibit feminine or masculine behavior in accordance with
that assessment.6
The binary system of gender is foundational to our society.7 Indeed,
we organize our medical, legal, educational, religious, and cultural insti-
tutions around the notion that gender is a natural, essential component of
personhood and the assumption that we can predict another person’s gen-
der based on outward appearance.8 Gender norms teach us which feel-
ings to express, how to relate to people of our same or different gender,
which hobbies and career paths to pursue, and which romantic partners
are appropriate.9 From the clothing we wear to the pronouns we use, the
binary system of gender permeates nearly every custom and pattern of
interaction in daily life.10 In fact, gender norms and expectations are so
imbedded in our schemas and social structures that the binary system
often escapes critical analysis, and is instead accepted as scientific fact.11
However, upon deeper examination, the factual and ethical flaws of this
system become apparent.
Under the binary system, people are categorized as either “male” or
“female” based on anatomical and physiological characteristics. How-
ever, the dominant sex code is not simply the product of biology—it is
socially constructed, as well. Language itself is a social construct, and by
using gendered language to label genitalia, society has ascribed social
meanings to physical attributes.12 Those social meanings are neither es-
5 Id.
6 See Gilbert, supra note 2, at 97.
7 See id. (“[S]ystematic bigenderism permeates every aspect of our lives and controls
and dictates every movement, word, and thought.”).
8 See id.
9 Id. at 94 (“[Gender] rules instruct us how to behave, including how to walk, talk, and
relate to others of the same and of the opposite gender. They delineate what careers and pas-
times are correct, what romantic interests are appropriate, what fears, ambitions, and expecta-
tions one ought to have. The rules determine who can giggle, who can cry, who will fight, who
should play with cars, and who with dolls . . . . There are specifications about earning expecta-
tions, financial responsibility, familial responsibility, and the consequences of sexual dalliance.
The gender rules cover everything we do and say, and they do so without seeming as if we are
being coerced or that we are even making choices.”).
10 Id.
11 Id. (“The ‘naturalness’ of the gender rules is the foundation of their being
unquestioned.”).
12 See JUDITH BUTLER, Undiagnosing Gender, in UNDOING GENDER 274, 284 (2004) (“If
the bodily traits indicate sex, then sex is not quite the same as the means by which it is
indicated. Sex is made understandable through the signs that indicate how it should be read or
understood. These bodily indicators are the cultural means by which the sexed body is read.
They are themselves bodily, and they operate as signs, so there is no easy way to distinguish
between what is ‘materially’ true and what is ‘culturally true about the sexed body.’”).
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sential nor inevitable, and can be subject to social change.13 Further, con-
trary to the assumptions underlying the binary system of gender, there is
actually a continuum of sexes, as evidenced by intersex individuals with
ambiguous reproductive structures and individuals with vulvas and non-
XX chromosome configurations.14 Indeed, as many as four percent of
births result in an intersex infant.15 However, the medical community’s
most common reaction to intersex infants is to surgically alter their bod-
ies to facilitate their conformance to one category or the other.16 This
process of “corrective” surgery is highly dependent on arbitrary concep-
tions of normalcy, and can have adverse long-term psychological im-
pacts.17 Moreover, the existence of intersex individuals is illustrative of
the non-binary nature of sex. Rather than surgically enforce adherence to
the binary system, the medical community should accept that the binary
system fails to encompass the reality of human biological diversity.
Comparatively, the term “gender” refers to the cultural norms and
expectations associated with biological sex.18 Under the binary system,
gendered behavior is assumed to be at least partially the product of phys-
iological forces, such as estrogen in women and testosterone in men.19
However, like the dominant sex code, the dominant gender code is also
socially constructed. No individual or institution exists in a cultural vac-
uum, so it is inconceivable to distinguish gendered norms and power
dynamics that are a product of biology from gendered norms and power
dynamics that are a product of socialization.20 Further, femininity and
masculinity are not fixed concepts; the meaning and function of gender
are historically, geographically, and situationally contextual.21 Cross-cul-
tural research indicates that the styles and temperaments men versus wo-
men are expected to embody fluctuate throughout time and space.22 In
13 Id.
14 See Jennifer L. Nye, The Gender Box, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 226, 229 (1998).
15 Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough, 33
THE SCIENCES 20, 21 (1993).
16 SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED 52–76 (2000).
17 RIKI WILCHINS, QUEER THEORY, GENDER THEORY 129 (2014) (the majority of infants
diagnosed as intersex have clitorises larger than two standard deviations from the mean which
is an arbitrary measure); see also Fausto-Sterling, supra note 15, at 23 (case studies from the
1930s–1960s, before surgical intervention was the automatic response to intersex infants,
demonstrate that children allowed to live as intersex were less prone to suicide and psychologi-
cal distress than those who were assigned a sex at birth).
18 Jamison Green, Introduction to Transgender Issues, in TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A
HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 1, 2 (2012).
19 Charlize Veritas, Men vs. Women—Hormones—A Transgender Perspective, HUF-
FINGTON POST, Feb. 18, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/charlize-veritas/men-vs-wo
men-hormones-a-t_b_9234380.html.
20 See Gilbert, supra note 2.
21 See Nye, supra note 14.
22 See John E. Williams & Deborah L. Best, Cross Cultural Views of Women and Men,
in PSYCHOLOGY AND CULTURE 191, 191–96 (1994).
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other words, a trait considered feminine in one period or region may be
considered masculine in another.23 As a basic example, at the turn of the
century, boys wore pink and girls wore blue, while today, pink is the
“girl” color and blue is the “boy” color.24 More poignantly, stereotypes
associated with masculinity vs. femininity, such as strength vs. fragility,
dominance vs. passivity, or rationality vs. emotionality, have more to do
with patriarchal power than biological realities.25 Despite cultural as-
sumptions regarding the natures of men and women, people across gen-
ders have diverse interests, desires, and behaviors, and are not easily
categorized into the boxes of feminine and masculine.26 Thus, gender
norms are largely a product of social forces, rather than solely biological,
physiological, or anatomical ones.
To summarize, hegemonic ideas regarding sex and gender are so-
cially constructed rather than naturally occurring. The binary system of
gender oversimplifies the reality of human diversity, and dualistic at-
tempts to define sex and gender have always been met with exceptions.27
B. The Medicalization of the Binary System of Gender
Despite its flaws, the binary system of gender remains central to our
medical establishment. For instance, the medical system fortifies the gen-
der binary by psycho-pathologizing all transgender people as Gender
Dysphoric (formerly referred to as Gender Identity Disorder (GID)).28
Transgender people are individuals whose gender identity or expression
does not conform to the social expectations for their assigned sex at
birth.29 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th
Edition (DSM-5) defines GD as “a difference between one’s experience/
expressed gender and assigned gender.”30 Once this condition is diag-
nosed, it can be treated in a variety of ways, including through psycho-
23 Id.
24 Jeanne Maglaty, When Did Girls Start Wearing Pink?, SMITHSONIAN (Apr. 7 2011),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/when-did-girls-start-wearing-pink-1370097.
25 Gilbert, supra note 2, at 94 (“[Gender] rules, which have evolved over many genera-
tions, are exactly those rules that protect the patriarchal framework through which women and
sexual and gender minorities have been oppressed and controlled.”).
26 Id. at 98 (“Bigenderism and heteronormativity ensure that the world is divided into
woman and man, and sexism sees to it that woman is undervalued and man overvalued.”).
27 See generally, Fausto-Sterling, supra note 15.
28 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013); Compare with AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DI-
AGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3rd ed. 1980).
29 Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Definitions, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN
(2018) https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-terminology-and-
definitions.
30 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION supra note 28.
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logical therapy, hormone treatment, or gender confirmation surgery.31
Indeed, some transgender people do require such medical attention.32
However, as a diagnostic category, GD equates trans experience with
mental illness, which is both scientifically and morally problematic.
GD can be conceptualized as socially produced rather than a bi-
omedical diagnosis.33 As previously discussed, the binary system is
rooted in simplistic, outmoded assumptions regarding gender and sex.34
Therefore, deviations from the binary system cannot be empirically mea-
sured, much less considered suggestive of mental illness. To objectively
classify someone as Gender Dysphoric one would need to (1) scientifi-
cally classify sex, (2) quantify “normal” gendered development and be-
havior, and (3) measure the degree to which the two variables “align.”
However, there is no standard methodology for differentiating the
sexes—whether classified according to hormones, chromosomes, or gen-
ital markers, there are always exceptions to the rule.35
Moreover, attempts to classify “normal” gendered behavior are
flawed at best, and oppressive at worst. Psychologists do not have an
empirically validated neuroanatomic or neurophysiological model to dis-
tinguish “healthy” from “pathological” gendered behavior.36 Efforts to
design such a model are inevitably problematic, because gender is so-
cially constructed rather than solely biologically based. Therefore, an
“unhealthy” amount of deviance from the gender binary cannot be quan-
tified in numerical terms. Further, the very notion that any degree of
gender deviance should be conceptualized as “unhealthy” is dubious, and
arguably a product of cissexism rather than science.37 In the face of fluc-
tuating gender norms and the absence of a legitimate biomedical model
for classifying GD, this diagnostic category remains scientifically
suspect.
31 LORI GIRSHICK, TRANSGENDER VOICES: BEYOND WOMEN AND MEN 75–79, 82–88
(2008).
32 Id.
33 See BUTLER, supra note 12, at 275 (“The diagnosis can operate in several ways, but
one way it can and does operate, especially in the hands of those who are transphobic, is as an
instrument of pathologization. To be diagnosed with gender identity disorder is to be found, in
some way, to be ill, sick, wrong, out of order, abnormal, and to suffer a certain stigmatization
as a consequence of the diagnosis being given at all.”).
34 See Gilbert, supra note 2, at 98.
35 See generally, Fausto-Sterling, supra note 15.
36 Heino F. Meyer-Bahlburg, From Mental Disorder to Iatrogenic Hypogonadism: Di-
lemmas in Conceptualizing Gender Identity Variants as Psychiatric Conditions, ARCHIVES OF
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 461–76 (2010).
37 See BUTLER, supra note 12, at 281 (“The diagnosis can (1) instill a sense of mental
disorder on those whom it diagnoses, (2) entrench the power of the diagnosis to conceptualize
transsexuality as a pathology, and (3) be used as a rationale by those who . . . aim to keep
transsexuality within the sphere of mental pathology.”). For a definition of cissexism, see infra
note 42.
40749-cjp_28-1 Sheet No. 71 Side A      11/30/2018   10:47:34
40749-cjp_28-1 Sheet No. 71 Side A      11/30/2018   10:47:34
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\28-1\CJP105.txt unknown Seq: 7 29-NOV-18 9:21
2018] TRANS-CENDING THE MEDICALIZATION OF GENDER 133
As Judith Butler explains, GD can be an oppressive tool of social
control when used to pathologize human diversity.38 Admittedly, psycho-
logical distress is associated with transgender status.39 However, GD lo-
cates the source of this anguish solely within “mentally ill” transgender
individuals.40 Consequently, broader causes, such as transphobia and in-
stitutional reliance on the binary system, go unchallenged.41 By assum-
ing that GD is a disease existing on a personal level and requiring
medical intervention, this diagnostic category obscures how cissexism42
engenders suffering, and lifts the burden from broader society to reevalu-
ate its sex-gender code. Therefore, by pathologizing anyone who trans-
gresses gender norms as mentally ill, GD reaffirms the binary system of
gender.
It is important to note that some transgender rights advocates favor
the use of GD as a diagnostic category.43 Proponents maintain that being
trans in a culture imbedded with the binary system of gender can induce
severe emotional distress, and by recognizing this issue, the DSM legiti-
mizes this experience.44 Indeed, the unique needs of trans people who
experience mental illness should be acknowledged and addressed. How-
ever, GD assumes that trans people inherently experience mental illness
by virtue of their gender identity, rather than as a product of cissexism.
Equating trans experience with mental illness reifies cisnormativity45 and
stigmatizes the trans population overall.46 By intensifying institutional
regulation and control of transgender people, this diagnostic category can
exacerbate the very suffering it purports to alleviate.47 Additionally, pro-
ponents maintain that a GD diagnosis is useful in obtaining insurance
benefits and other entitlements.48 However, this justification exploits the
needs of low-income trans people49 to justify cisnormativity, and ignores
38 Id.
39 See BUTLER, supra note 12, at 294.
40 Id. at 275 (“The diagnosis assumes that certain gender norms have not been properly
embodied and that an error and a failure have taken place . . . it assumes the language of
correction, adaption, and normalization; it seeks to uphold the gender norms of the world as it
is currently constituted and tends to pathologize any effort to produce gender in ways that fail
to conform to existing norms.”).
41 Id.
42 Cissexism is prejudice or discrimination against transgender people. Cissexism, Ox-
ford Dictionary (2015).
43 See Meyer-Bahlburg, supra note 34.
44 BUTLER, supra note 12, at 295 (“[P]art of what the diagnosis offers is a form of social
recognition.”).
45 Cisnormativity is the assumption that all human beings are cisgender (i.e., have a
gender identity which matches the sex they were assigned at birth, unless otherwise specified).
Cisnormativity, The Queer Dictionary (2014).
46 See BUTLER, supra note 12, at 275.
47 See BUTLER, supra note 12, at 295.
48 See id. at 281.
49 See id.
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how the stigma fortified by diagnosis can cause transgender people to
lose rights and liberties, including child custody, employment, and hous-
ing.50 Therefore, though this diagnostic category may offer potential for
immediate benefits or more compassionate treatment on an individual
level, its long-term impact is detrimental to the transgender commu-
nity.51 Like the removal of “homosexuality” from the DSM in 1973,52
challenging GD as a diagnostic category respects the legitimacy, dignity,
and autonomy of a marginalized community.53
In sum, the medicalization of gender suffers from technical and ide-
ological shortcomings. The scientific basis for GD is questionable be-
cause the definition of this diagnosis relies on the inadequate binary
system of gender.54 Additionally, pathologizing deviations from the bi-
nary system of gender reaffirms the binary itself, which inhibits critical
examination of our sex-gender code and stigmatizes transgender peo-
ple.55 In short, transgender people are not sick; trans oppression is the
sign of a sick society.
C. Courts’ Reliance on the Medicalized Binary System of Gender
Though the medicalization of the binary system of gender is morally
and scientifically suspect, courts are reluctant to validate trans people’s
gender identity without mandate from the medical profession.56 Courts
rely on medical evidence to establish an individual’s transgender status
as legitimate, and therefore worthy of recognition under the law.57 This
reliance on a medical conception of gender has triggered transphobic lan-
guage in legal decisions. For instance, in writing for the majority in
Farmer v. Brennan, Justice Souter relied on the definition of “trans-
gender” found in the 1989 Encyclopedia of Medicine: “one who has ‘[a]
rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently uncomforta-
ble about his or her anatomical sex,’ and who typically seeks medical
50 See BUTLER, supra note 12, at 285.
51 Id. at 275 (“[the diagnosis] continues to pathologize as a mental disorder what ought
to be considered instead as one among many human possibilities of determining one’s gender
for oneself.”).
52 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).
53 Some have argued that GID has become an indirect way of diagnosing homosexuality
as a gender identity problem. See BUTLER, supra note 12, at 277.
54 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 28.
55 See BUTLER, supra note 12, at 294.
56 See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1193 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that
Schwenk never received any medical or psychiatric treatment for gender dysphoria).
57 See Jerry L. Dasti, Advocating a Broader Understanding of the Necessity of Sex-Reas-
signment Surgery Under Medicaid, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1738, 1758 (2002) (noting that “[t]he
explanation of transgender identities in medical . . . terms is common throughout the case law,
even in cases that do not deal specifically with gender related medical care or sex designation,”
and “it is the transgender party who inserts the medical analysis into the record” as a strategic
way to give “legitimacy to a transgender identity.”).
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treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to bring about a per-
manent sex change.”58 This stigmatizing definition conflates trans expe-
rience with mental illness and excludes trans people who do not seek
medical treatment from legal consideration. Similarly, in Maggert v.
Hanks, Judge Posner rejected the notion that a prisoner not formally di-
agnosed with GD is entitled to treatment, and superfluously inserted his
prejudicial opinion that “someone eager to undergo this mutilation is
plainly suffering from a profound psychiatric disorder.”59 Not only do
such decisions thwart the goals of the transgender plaintiffs, but they also
perpetuate negative stereotypes about transgender people and predicate
legal rights on the medicalized, binary sex-gender code.
As the cited decisions illustrate, the legal system’s reliance on a
medical model of gender prioritizes transgender plaintiffs who have been
diagnosed as Gender Dysphoric and have either undergone or are under-
going hormone therapy or surgical treatment. This approach wrongly po-
sitions the medical establishment as a gatekeeping institution that polices
gender conformity. Further, this approach creates a hierarchy of trans-
gender people and fails to protect vulnerable transgender populations.
First, reliance on a medical model of gender excludes people who do not
match the diagnostic criteria of medical categories.60 There is great di-
versity of gender identity and expression within the transgender commu-
nity; many transgender people do not require medical treatment (e.g., a
trans woman may conceptualize her penis as a woman’s penis), some
choose to embrace gender fluidity or a non-binary identity (e.g., gender-
queer and agender individuals), and many prefer non-medical forms of
gender expression (e.g., wigs, binding breasts, or cosmetics)61 Second,
reliance on a medical model of gender also excludes many young, low-
income, or undocumented people who may want, but do not have access
to, legal, trans affirming healthcare.62 By predicating legal rights on
medical treatment, and relying on medical experts to legitimize a trans-
gender individual’s identity, those who do not need or do not have access
58 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (quoting THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AS-
SOCIATION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1006 (1989)).
59 See Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (simultaneously rejecting
prisoner’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment for failure to treat gender dysphoria and
labeling all transsexuals “profound[ly] . . . disorder[ed].”).
60 Abby Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgender People Strangers to the Law?, 20
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150, 185, 194 (2005).
61 Id.
62 National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR), Rights of Transgender Prisoners, http://
ncflr.convio.net/site/DocServer/RightsofTransgenderPrisoners.pdf?docID=6381 (last visited
Nov. 10, 2017) (“[I]t is often difficult for transsexual prisoners to document a prior prescrip-
tion for hormones, either because of the practical difficulties and limitations imposed by incar-
ceration, or because many transsexual prisoners are indigent and do not have private
physicians willing to advocate for them.”).
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to trans affirming healthcare are excluded from legal protections. As
such, the legal system effectively coerces transgender people into under-
going medical procedures which can be inaccessible, dangerous, and
simply unnecessary.
Further, the legal system’s reliance on a medical model of gender
contributes to the stigmatization of the transgender community overall.63
Conceptualizing trans experience as a mental illness glorifies normative
gendered behavior and delegitimizes trans individuals’ attempts to claim
self-constructed gender identities.64 There is a distinction between the
reality of gender and the medicalized gendered framework in which cur-
rent law operates. This disparity inhibits the creation of legal rules that
protect the entire trans community and frustrates the long-term goal of
expanding society’s sex-gender code.
D. Toward a Self-Definition Model of Gender
Thus far, this Note has argued, (1) the binary system of gender is
flawed, (2) the medical establishment reinforces the binary system of
gender, and (3) the legal system’s reliance on the medicalized, binary
system of gender has practical limitations and adverse social conse-
quences. However, this Note has yet to suggest how the legal system
should conceptualize gender instead. To protect transgender people from
abuse and discrimination, courts must adopt a more flexible and inclu-
sive approach to gender. Courts should move away from the medical
model, and instead honor self-identification.
Under a self-definition model of gender, individuals are permitted to
construct gender on their own terms, free from the arbitrary, outmoded
constraints of the medical establishment.65 Within this framework, auton-
omous control over one’s own gender identity is considered fundamental,
and difference and variability are accepted without judgment.66 Trans-
gender people are not legitimized or afforded rights in accordance with
the degree to which they have undergone medical treatment. Instead, this
model celebrates the diversity of the transgender community, and ac-
knowledges the intimacy of one’s personal experience of gender.
The binary system of gender is socially constructed, which means it
is subject to social change. As a powerful institution of socialization, the
legal system has a unique capacity to pave the way for the recognition
and validation of a multiplicity of genders. By questioning and reformu-
lating popular conceptions of gender, the legal system can radically
63 See BUTLER, supra note 12.
64 See id.
65 Christine Peek, Breaking Out of the Prison Hierarchy: Transgender Prisoners, Rape,
and the Eighth Amendment, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1211, 1217 (2004).
66 See Gilbert, supra note 2, at 100.
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restructure the range of gendered and sexualized behavior not only ac-
cepted, but celebrated in society.
II. LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE TRANSGENDER
AND INCARCERATED
A. Disproportionate Representation of Transgender People in the
Criminal Justice System
One particularly vulnerable transgender population that requires
broader, more effective legal protections is transgender people who are
incarcerated. This group requires especial attention because transgender
people enter the criminal justice system at disproportionately high
rates.67 Indeed, “[n]early one in six transgender Americans—and one in
two black transgender people—has been to prison.”68
Bias and abuse from police may contribute to the transgender prison
crisis.69 Transgender people report facing disrespect, harassment, dis-
criminatory arrests, and sexual assault by law enforcement officers at
very high rates.70 Indeed, more than half (58%) of respondents to the
National Center for Transgender Equality’s (NCTE) 2015 survey re-
ported facing mistreatment from law enforcement officers in the past
year.71 Consequently, a majority of respondents (57%) said they would
be somewhat uncomfortable or very uncomfortable asking for help from
the police.72 Issues of police profiling, violence, and discriminatory treat-
ment are exacerbated for low-income trans people and trans people of
color.73
67 LAMBDA LEGAL, Transgender Incarcerated People in Crisis, in TRANSGENDER
RIGHTS TOOLKIT 5–9 (2016) [hereinafter LAMBDA], http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/de
fault/files/transgender_booklet_-_incarcerated.pdf, citing NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK
FORCE AND NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, National Transgender Discrimi-
nation Survey (2011), http://www.endtransdiscrimination.org/Force.
68 Id.
69 A study of police attitudes toward transgender people revealed that police often profile
transgender women as sex workers. Because prostitution is illegal, this stereotype puts trans-
gender women at risk of harassment from police. See Chris Daley et al., Walking While Trans-
gender: Law Enforcement Harassment of San Francisco’s Transgender/ Transsexual
Community i, ix (2000).
70 James S.E. Herman et al., The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, National
Center for Transgender Equality (NCTE) 1, 187 (2016).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 188.
73 Id. at 186. People of color, including American Indian (74%), multiracial (71%), La-
tino/a (66%), and Black (61%) respondents, were more likely to have experienced one or more
forms of mistreatment. Respondents who were homeless in the past year (78%), those who
were currently unemployed (75%), were also more likely to report one or more of these
experiences.
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Additionally, transgender people suffer high rates of employment
discrimination and isolation from their larger communities.74 Conse-
quently, transgender people face disproportionate rates of poverty and
homelessness.75 This plight can force transgender individuals into under-
ground economies, such as drug sales or sex work.76 Impoverished trans-
gender individuals can also face consequences for “quality of life”
crimes, such as sleeping in public or loitering for the purpose of prostitu-
tion.77 Therefore, poverty increases risk of incarceration.78 Indeed,
NCTE transgender survey respondents who were homeless reported
higher rates of incarceration.79
Due to pervasive discrimination, over-policing, and poverty, trans-
gender people are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice
system.80 The transgender prison crisis exemplifies a larger pattern of
violence and injustice in US society, which disproportionately impacts
poor people, people of color, and those who deviate from the binary sys-
tem of gender.81 Incarcerated trans people caught in the intersectional
matrix of cissexism, racism, and classism face a unique set of human
rights challenges, and require stronger, more comprehensive legal protec-
tions than those currently in place.
B. Housing Classifications
One challenge that incarcerated transgender people face is con-
testing incorrect housing designations. Prisons are segregated according
to the binary system of gender, and the vast majority of prison adminis-
trations employ a medical model in making housing determinations.
Though practices are changing in certain localities, most prisons house
people according to genital markers (e.g., sex assigned at birth).82 To
switch facilities, incarcerated transgender people typically need to have
74 Paying an Unfair Price: The Financial Penalty for Being Transgender in America,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (2015), http://www.lgbtmap
.org/file/paying-an-unfair-price-transgender.pdf.
75 Dean Spade, Compliance Is Gendered: Struggling for Gender Self-Determination in a
Hostile Economy, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 217 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2000).
76 See NCTE, supra note 70.
77 Alexander L. Lee, Gendered Crime and Punishment: Strategies to Protect Trans-
gender, Gender Variant and Intersex People in America’s Prisons, GIC TIP J., at 9 (2004).
78 See Karen Dolan, The Poor Get Prison: The Alarming Spread of the Criminalization
of Poverty, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (2015).
79 See NCTE, supra note 70, at 190.
80 See LAMBDA, supra note 67.
81 See id.
82 JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S HANDBOOK, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, Issues of
Importance to Transgender Prisoners (2010) [hereinafter JAILHOUSE], http://jailhouselaw
.org/issues-of-importance-to-transgender-prisoners/.
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legally changed their sex.83 In most states, to legally change one’s sex,
courts require a physician to attest that the person seeking the change
sought medical body modification.84 Therefore, this legal barrier reifies a
medicalized conception of the binary system of gender.
Requiring court-ordered sex change based on physician testimony
makes little practical or moral sense. First, these legal barriers are de-
nounced by the medical community itself, because using surgery to mea-
sure whether or not someone is transgender assumes that treatment is
uniform across the board.85 According to the World Professional Associ-
ation for Transgender Health, “[t]reatment is individualized: What helps
one person alleviate Gender Dysphoria might be very different from
what helps another person. This process may or may not involve a
change in gender expression or body modifications.”86 Indeed, surgery is
not always recommended, desired, or even accessible—particularly for
vulnerable transgender populations, including those who are young,
poor, or undocumented.87 Second, these hurdles infringe on the privacy
of transgender individuals by forcing them to disclose medical records.88
Third, this policy increases trans individuals’ risk of violence and sexual
assault;89 fails to provide proper privacy for basic activities, such as
showering and strip searches;90 and increases difficulty in obtaining gen-
der-specific clothing, personal care products, and proper healthcare.91 Fi-
nally, this policy fortifies the misguided assumption that gender non-
conformity is a mental illness and disregards how transgender people
identify themselves.92
83 Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations, LAMBDA LEGAL (2014), http://www
.lambdalegal.org/publications/changing-birth-certificate-sex-designations-state-by-state-
guidelines.
84 Id.
85 AMA Calls for Modernizing Birth Certificate Policies, AMA NEWS ROOM (2014),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2014/2014-06-09-modernizing-birth-certificate-
policies.page.
86 See LAMBDA, supra note 67.
87 See NCLR, supra note 62.
88 Eli Coleman et al., Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and
Gender Nonconforming People, 7 THE WORLD PROF’L ASSOC. FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH 1,
5 (2011), https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/Web%20Transfer/SOC/Standards%
20of%20Care%20V7%20-%202011%20WPATH.pdf.
89 Stephen Donaldson, A Million Jockers, Punks, and Queens, in PRISON MASCULINITIES
118, 119 (Don Sabo et al. eds., 2001) (“[Transvestites] are highly desirable as sexual partners
because of their willingness to adopt ‘feminine’ traits, and they are highly visible, but the
queens remain submissive to the ‘Men’ and, in accordance with the prevalent sexism, may not
hold positions of power in the prisoner social structure.”).
90 See id.
91 See Unjust: How the Broken Criminal Justice System Fails LGBT People, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS & MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 93 (2016) [hereinafter UNJUST],
http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/lgbt-criminal-justice.pdf.
92 See id.
40749-cjp_28-1 Sheet No. 74 Side B      11/30/2018   10:47:34
40749-cjp_28-1 Sheet No. 74 Side B      11/30/2018   10:47:34
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\28-1\CJP105.txt unknown Seq: 14 29-NOV-18 9:21
140 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 28:127
The judicial system has done little to alleviate this issue. In general,
courts have not been receptive to plaintiff’s challenges to the system, and
have affirmed that prison officials have the power to decide where trans-
gender people should be placed.93 For instance, in Meriwether v. Faulk-
ner, a transgender woman brought suit claiming that prison
administration violated her Equal Protection rights by placing her in a
male facility.94 In that case, the plaintiff considered herself to be female,
was diagnosed with GD, had undergone nine years of estrogen therapy,
had surgically augmented her face, breasts, and hips, and wore makeup
and feminine clothing.95 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit dismissed her
claim because she did not present evidence that the prison’s decision to
place her in a male facility was motivated by an attempt to discriminate
against her.96 In its decision, the court relied on Meachum v. Fano, in
which the Supreme Court stated that incarcerated people do not have the
right to be placed in any particular facility.97
Encouragingly, prison housing policies may be changing in light of
conflicts with the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). Passed in 2003
and implemented in 2012, PREA requires prisons to make housing deci-
sions on a case-by-case basis.98 Notably, PREA states that agencies “may
not simply assign the inmate to a facility based on genital status.”99 Fur-
ther, the housing guidelines instruct prison officials to consider both the
inmates view of their own gender and their preferences regarding
safety.100 These provisions are a positive step in the right direction be-
cause they acknowledge the diversity of the transgender community and
move away from a medicalized system of gender and in favor of a self-
definition model.
Nevertheless, PREA is subject to several limitations. Namely,
PREA does not provide incarcerated people with a private right of ac-
93 See, e.g., Lucrecia v. Samples, NO. C-93-3651, 1995 WL 630016 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16,
1995); Long v. Nix, 877 F. Supp. 1358, 1366-67 (S.D. Iowa 1995); Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F.
Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1986).
94 Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 1987).
95 Id. at 410.
96 See id. at 415 (“[A] prison administrative decision may give rise to an equal protection
claim only if the plaintiff can establish that state officials had purposefully and intentionally
discriminated against him. While complaining that the defendants’ decision to classify her as a
male was arbitrary and irrational, plaintiff has not alleged any design or intent to
discriminate.”).
97 See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 215 (1976) (“[G]iven a valid conviction, the
criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State
may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of
confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution.”).
98 28 C.F.R. § 115.42.
99 Id.
100 Does a Policy That Houses Transgender or Intersex Inmates Based Solely on External
Genital Anatomy Violate Standard 115.42(c) & (e)?, NAT’L PREA RESOURCE CTR. (2016),
http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/node/3927.
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tion.101 Instead, PREA carries potential financial penalties for non-com-
pliant prison systems.102 Monetary penalties, however, are an inadequate
form of enforcement because financial losses can result in decreased ser-
vices to the inmates themselves. Because incarcerated people cannot
bring suit alleging PREA violations, actually enforcing PREA is an up-
hill battle, and its function is more expressive than practical.103 Further,
compliance with PREA varies throughout the country.104 Several states,
including Idaho, Texas, and Arizona, have publicly refused to comply
with PREA, effectively exchanging a portion of federal funding for free-
dom to craft their own policies.105 Finally, PREA’s instruction to make
housing decisions on a “case-by-case basis” is largely vague.106 The lack
of specifics regarding what individualized assessments should entail
gives facilities significant discretion in making housing determinations.
Admittedly, housing classification systems that are strongly rooted
in self-identification, rather than medicalization, will likely be subject to
criticism. Skeptics may fear that such systems afford incarcerated people
too much latitude in deciding where to be housed. Specifically, skeptics
may worry that in such a system, a cisgender107 man could pretend to be
a trans woman and secure housing in a women’s facility for invidious
reasons. However, this fear may be overstated, as an increasing number
of localities—including Cook County, IL; Cumberland, ME; Denver,
CO; and Washington D.C.—have had success with policies that classify
people by gender identity rather than sex assigned at birth.108 Further,
case law demonstrates that transgender women can be housed in wo-
men’s facilities without incident.109 Certainly, this Note does not propose
a housing classification system where prison officials are prohibited from
taking medical evidence into consideration when making housing deter-
minations. Rather, this Note advocates a housing classification system
101 See Gabriel Arkles, Prison Rape Elimination Act Litigation and the Perpetuation of
Sexual Harm, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 821 (2014).
102 Lena Palacios, The Prison Rape Elimination Act and the Limits of Liberal Reform,
THE GENDER POLICY REPORT (2017), http://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/the-prison-rape-elimi
nation-act-and-the-limits-of-liberal-reform/.
103 See Giovanna Shay, PREA’s Elusive Promise: Can DOJ Regulations Protect LGBT
Incarcerated People? 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 343, 353 (2014).
104 Amanda Hess, Protecting Trans Prisoners (2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/dou
ble_x/doublex/2015/01/leslieann_manning_lawsuit_a_transgender_woman_sues_the_sullivan
_correctional.html.
105 Id.
106 28 C.F.R. § 115.42.
107 “Cisgender” refers to a person whose gender identity corresponds with the sex he or
she was assigned at birth. Cisgender, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018).
108 See LAMBDA, supra note 67.
109 Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir.
2014), rev’d en banc granted, opinion withdrawn (Feb. 12, 2014), rev’d en banc, 774 F.3d 63
(1st Cir. 2014), and rev’d, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that another transgender woman
who was convicted of murder was housed in a female facility without incident).
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where due weight is given to each person’s self-proclaimed gender iden-
tity and safety concerns. Balanced, individualized assessments will pro-
vide a more reliable basis for respecting the safety and dignity of
transgender people who are incarcerated.
To summarize, most prison housing policies are still informed by a
medicalized conception of the binary system of gender.110 However,
making housing determinations based on subjective interpretations of
outward physical characteristics or medical diagnoses is not a satisfac-
tory basis for respecting the emotional and physical wellbeing of incar-
cerated transgender people. Such policies endanger transgender people
who are incarcerated, and stigmatize transgender people overall. Though
PREA presents an example of progress, this Act is subject to several
limitations.111 To protect the autonomy and security of people who are
transgender and incarcerated, courts should require prisons to craft effec-
tive housing policies that are rooted in a self-definition model of gender.
C. Healthcare
Another challenge that incarcerated transgender people face is se-
curing access to gender-affirming healthcare. Though healthcare needs
vary by individual, some transgender people require medical procedures
such as hormone replacement therapy (HRT) or gender confirmation sur-
gery (GCS). The likely result of denying such individuals treatment is
suicide or self-mutilation.112 However, prison policies for accessing such
care vary widely, are largely discretionary, and are rarely satisfactory.
Indeed, the NCTE 2015 report found that nearly one in four trans people
undergoing HRT prior to incarceration were denied access to hormones
while in prison.113
Some incarcerated trans people have successfully argued that deny-
ing a person access to trans-affirming healthcare violates the Eighth
Amendment’s114 prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.115 Indeed,
the Eighth Amendment guarantees medical care to prisoners who have
110 See JAILHOUSE, supra note 82.
111 See, e.g., Arkles supra note 101.
112 See Coleman, supra note 88.
113 See NCTE, supra note 70.
114 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
115 Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 248 (D. Mass. 2012) (invalidating prison’s
blanket prohibition on certain methods of treatment for gender dysphoria); Barrett v. Coplan,
292 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.N.H. 2003) (finding Eighth Amendment violation when prison official
denied trans person an evaluation for treatment for GD); Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d
156 (D. Mass. 2002) (directing prison officials to provide adequate physician-recommended
treatment which might include HRT or GCS); Allard v. Gomez, 9 Fed. Appx. 793, 794 (9th
Cir. 2001) (finding a triable question of fact as to whether a trans person was denied HRT
based on “an individualized medical evaluation or as a result of a blanket rule, the application
of which constituted deliberate indifference to [plaintiff’s] medical needs.”).
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lost the ability to provide for their own healthcare needs.116 As noted in
Estelle v. Gamble, “an inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his
medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.
In the worst cases, such failure may actually produce physical tor-
ture.”117 A successful Eighth Amendment claim requires plaintiffs to sat-
isfy two prongs.118 First, the plaintiff must show she has a “serious
medical need.”119 Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defen-
dant acted with “deliberate indifference” to that serious medical need.120
Courts have consistently recognized GD as “a serious medical
need.”121 Additionally, several courts have held that prisons that do not
offer adequate treatment for GD act with “deliberate indifference” to that
need.122 For instance, in Fields v. Smith, several transgender people
housed in the Wisconsin Department of Corrections brought suit alleging
that the prison’s healthcare policy violated their Eighth Amendment
rights.123 The prison’s policy was a blanket provision which prevented
medical personnel from providing HRT or GCS to any incarcerated
transgender person.124 The court concluded that this policy constituted a
“deliberate indifference to a serious medical need,”125 and was unper-
suaded by the defendant’s argument that the policy was justified on
safety or cost-saving grounds.126 Consequently, the policy was invali-
dated as an Eighth Amendment violation.127
Other courts have held that treatments cannot be denied merely be-
cause they are expensive,128 nor can they be denied merely because they
116 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
117 Id.
118 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (U.S. 1994).
119 Id.
120 Id. (“[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negli-
gence . . . only the former violates the Clause.”).
121 See, e.g., Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]ranssexualism
constitutes a serious medical need.”); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995)
(prison officials must address the medical needs of “transsexual” prisoner); Phillips v. Michi-
gan Dep’t of Corrections, 731 F. Supp. 792, 799 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (blanket prohibition on
treatment for GD is grounds an Eighth Amendment claim).
122 See, e.g., Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
123 Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 555–56 (7th Cir. 2011).
124 Id.
125 Id. (“[D]efendants did not produce any evidence that another treatment could be an
adequate replacement for hormone therapy.”).
126 Id. (“DOC might actually incur greater costs by refusing to provide hormones, since
inmates with GID might require other expensive treatments or enhanced monitoring by prison
security.”).
127 Id.
128 Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1509 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that lack of funds
will not excuse failure to maintain certain minimum level of medical service necessary to
avoid imposition of cruel and unusual punishment).
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are controversial.129 Further, treatments are to be consistent with ac-
cepted medical standards,130 and prisoners who were already undergoing
HRT at the time of incarceration cannot be abruptly taken off such treat-
ment unless there is a clear medical reason for doing so.131 Perhaps the
most successful transgender Eighth Amendment plaintiff to date is Shi-
loh Quine, who in January 2017 became the first US inmate to undergo
government-funded gender confirmation surgery.132
However, most healthcare related Eighth Amendment claims are not
so successful.133 The second prong of Eighth Amendment analysis, “de-
liberate indifference,” has two parts.134 First, the plaintiff must establish
that the responsible official is aware of facts from which that official
could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and second, the
official must also draw that inference.135 For many plaintiffs, satisfying
129 Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 182 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that it is
unreasonable for prison officials to fail to provide medical care due to its controversial nature
because “it is the primary purpose of the Bill of Rights . . . to protect rights of minorities from
the will of the majority.”).
130 See Moore v. Duffy, 255 F.3d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[M]edical treatment may not
so deviate from the applicable standard of care as to evidence a physician’s deliberate indiffer-
ence”); Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding an eighth Amend-
ment violation where treatment represents “such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did
not base the decision on such a judgment”); United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st
Cir. 1987) (finding Eighth Amendment guarantees medical care “at a level reasonably com-
mensurate with modern medical science and of a quality acceptable within prudent profes-
sional standards.”).
131 See, e.g., De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634–35 (4th Cir. 2003); Wolfe v.
Horn, 130 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Phillips, 731 F. Supp. at 800 (“Taking
measures which actually reverse the effects of years of healing medical treatment . . . is mea-
surably worse [than failing to provide such treatment in the first place.]”)
132 Quine v. Beard, Transgender Law Center (2017), https://transgenderlawcenter.org/
quine-v-beard (2017). Quine is a transgender woman who was housed in a male facility
(CDCR). She filed suit, asserting that GCS and access to commissary items available to female
inmates were medically necessary treatment for her gender dysphoria, and denying her access
to such treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. After extensive litigation, Quine
and CDCR reached an agreement, which included Quine undergoing GCS and transferring to a
female facility. See Quine v. Beard, No. 14-CV-02726-JST, 2017 WL 1540758, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 28, 2017).
133 See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that prison
doctors were entitled to qualified immunity regarding her Eighth Amendment claim after
transgender person suffered psychological and physical withdrawal as a result of the termina-
tion of HRT where a prison doctor who “knew absolutely nothing about transsexuals” deter-
mined she was not a “genuine transsexual”); See Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that it is permissible to withhold treatment from transgender prisoners because
neither public nor private health insurance programs will pay for GCS); Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d
761 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that prisoner diagnosed with GID had no right to proper clothing
options or to HRT); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that transgender
prisoner is not entitled to proper clothing, cosmetics, or HRT).
134 See Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 248 (D. Mass. 2012).
135 Id.
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both parts of the “deliberate indifference” inquiry proves to be an insur-
mountable burden.136
For example, in 2014, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
determined that a rigid policy which prohibited prison officials from pro-
viding GCS to any transgender inmate did not constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation.137 In that case, plaintiff Michelle Kosilek sued
prison officials for GCS after a decade of incarceration without any form
of trans affirming medical or psychological care.138 While in prison,
Kosilek attempted to kill and castrate herself.139 In a landmark decision,
the Massachusetts district court found that GCS was the only adequate
care to treat Kosilek’s GD, and held that Massachusetts’ failure to pro-
vide such surgery constituted cruel and unusual punishment.140 However,
the First Circuit later reversed the district court’s decision, holding that
GCS was not medically necessary to treat Kosilek, thus the prison policy
did not constitute deliberate indifference to GD.141
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Thompson criticized the majority
for employing de novo review to the factual issue of “deliberate indiffer-
ence,” instead of the applicable, deferential, clear error standard.142 She
further stated that the majority opinion “aggrieves an already marginal-
ized community, and enables correctional systems to further postpone
their adjustment to the crumbling gender binary.”143 Controversy sur-
rounding Kosilek’s care extended beyond the First Circuit panel;
Kosilek’s search for relief also incited public outrage and garnered the
ridicule of political officials.144 The indignation surrounding an incarcer-
ated person seeking GCS reflects transphobic cultural attitudes, and the
widespread conception that those who challenge the gender binary are
sick, societal outsiders, rather than equal members of diverse society en-
titled to rights, recognition, and respect.
136 See, e.g., Moritsugu, 222 F.3d at 106.
137 Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
138 Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir.
2014), rev’d en banc granted, opinion withdrawn (Feb. 12, 2014), on rev’d en banc, 774 F.3d
63 (1st Cir. 2014), and rev’d, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
139 Kosilek 2012, 889 F. Supp. at 197.
140 Id.
141 Kosilek 2014, 774 F.3d at 94–96 (holding that the District Court erred in its credibility
determinations regarding the expert witnesses who testified that GCS is medically necessary
and ignored significant contrary evidence regarding the adequacy of alternative treatments for
GID).
142 Kosilek 2014, 774 F.3d at 98 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 113.
144 Kosilek 2012, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 203 (“The Lieutenant Governor . . . publicly opposed
using tax revenues to provide Kosilek sex reassignment surgery. Many members of the state
legislature, including one who was close to Dennehy, did the same. In addition, the media
regularly ridiculed the idea that a murderer could ever be entitled to such “bizarre”
treatment.”).
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Moreover, even successful Eighth Amendment claims have been
subject to severe limitations. As previously discussed, courts have con-
sistently recognized GD as a serious medical need, and many have re-
quired prisons to provide some form of treatment in response to that
need. However, such decisions rarely specify the type or level of treat-
ment required.145 In other words, the Eighth Amendment may guarantee
transgender inmates the right to some treatment for GD, but it does not
guarantee choice in determining the course of that treatment.146 As such,
psychological therapy may be considered sufficient, even when the indi-
vidual maintains that HRT or GCS are necessary. Further, even when
prisons do provide HRT, there are no legal guarantees that hormones will
be provided at the appropriate levels or with necessary physical and psy-
chological support services.147 Such policies give the prison administra-
tion wide discretion in determining when and what treatments are
needed, which then positions the medical establishment as the gatekeeper
of gender expression and deprioritizes a self-definition model of gender.
Additionally, as previously noted, courts have held that individuals
who were already undergoing HRT at the time of incarceration cannot be
abruptly taken off such treatment unless there is a clear medical reason
for doing so.148 While such policies protect transgender people who had
access to trans affirming healthcare prior to incarceration, such policies
fail to protect more vulnerable transgender populations. Incarcerated
transgender people are disproportionately indigent, and are thus unlikely
to have private physicians who are willing to advocate on their behalf.149
If a person requires HRT but did not have legal, documented access to it
prior to incarceration, she does not come within the scope of such poli-
cies.150 Courts do not consider an inmate’s ability to pay for medical
treatment prior to incarceration relevant to Eighth Amendment analysis
for virtually any other medical condition. Therefore, such policies simul-
taneously medicalize gender non-conformity, yet deny GD the impor-
tance attributed to other medical conditions.
145 See, e.g., Briones v. Grannis’, CV 09-08074-VAP(VBK), 2010 WL 3636139, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not grant a prisoner his or
her choice of treatment for GD).
146 Id.
147 Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the
Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 545 (2000).
148 See De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634–35.
149 NCLR, supra note 62.
150 Cf. Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610, 615–16 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (granting qualified
immunity to the Medical Director of the Bureau of Prisons, holding he was not obligated to
provide HRT to a transgender person whose request was “completely unsupported by treat-
ment records or recommendations from local medical personnel establishing a need for
treatment.”).
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Further, though courts consider GD to be a “serious medical need,”
some trans people have difficulty proving they have GD.151 Again, many
transgender people did not have access to trans-friendly healthcare prior
to incarceration, and are thus unlikely to have received a formal diagno-
sis.152 Further, prison medial staff often lacks experience caring for trans
patients, and is not qualified to diagnose individuals as Gender
Dysphoric.153 Even when qualified staff is present, the psychological
evaluation process can be unnecessarily bureaucratic, and inherently
privileges the will of the prison staff over the needs of the incarcerated
individual.154 For instance, a person’s access to treatment can be im-
peded if her behavior does not coincide with the prison psychologist’s
conception of “sufficiently” transgender.155 Indeed, many transgender
people do not conform to the exact diagnostic criteria for GD as laid out
by the DSM-5, which excludes many gender-nonconforming and non-
binary people from its parameters.156
More fundamentally, any reliance on the Eighth Amendment as
grounds for transgender individual’s healthcare rights is subject to ideo-
logical limitations because such legal reasoning is based on the medical
model of gender transgression. To make a successful Eighth Amendment
case, plaintiffs must assert that their gender identity constitutes a “serious
medical need.”157 This argument relies on the assumption that “healthy”
gender expression conforms to a binary, and reinforces the belief that
deviation from this binary is pathological. While this argument may as-
sist incarcerated transgender people in fulfilling their immediate medical
needs, it forces plaintiffs to stigmatize their community as inherently dis-
ordered. Instead of conceptualizing trans-affirming healthcare as neces-
sary tools for healthy gender expression, courts give such care reluctant
approval to individuals who are seen as ill and out of order.158 Therefore,
an Eighth Amendment approach is problematic because it forces incar-
151 Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (transgender inmate suffered psycho-
logical and physical withdrawal symptoms as a result of the abrupt termination of her HRT
where a prison doctor who “knew absolutely nothing about transsexuals” determined she was
not a “genuine transsexual.”).
152 NCLR, supra note 62.
153 Id.
154 Harron Walker, For Trans Prisoners Access to Healthcare Remains Abysmal, Vice
(2017), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/d7789m/for-trans-prisoners-access-to-healthcare-
remains-abysmal.
155 See, e.g., Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of
claim that denying HRT constituted Eighth Amendment violation because prison psychologist
believed that plaintiff’s “sexual identity [was] polymorphous and his sexual aims ambiguous,”
but the prison psychologist did not believe that plaintiff “suffer[ed] from gender dysphoria.”).
156 See, e.g., Lloyd supra note 60.
157 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (U.S. 1994).
158 See BUTLER, supra note 12.
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cerated transgender people to choose between their medical needs and
their interest in discussing gender in a way that is empowering.
Critics may argue that requiring prisons to provide HRT and GCS to
transgender people would impose unreasonable costs on the state. How-
ever, cost-saving arguments may be misplaced. In Fields v. Smith, the
court noted that the costs of HRT and GCS are comparable to, and often
cheaper than, the costs of other drugs and surgeries.159 The court empha-
sized that prisons may actually incur greater costs by refusing to provide
hormones, since “inmates with GD might require other expensive treat-
ments or enhanced monitoring by prison security.”160 More importantly,
incurred costs are justified because transgender people, advocates, and
medical practitioners agree that HRT and GCS are not elective proce-
dures.161 Rather, they are necessary medical care for those transgender
individuals who experience physical and emotional distress that is not
alleviated by other treatment options alone.162 Indeed, the likely result of
denying individuals such treatment is suicide and self-mutilation.163 As
the court asserted in Fields v. Smith, “just as the legislature cannot out-
law all effective cancer treatments for prison inmates, it cannot outlaw
the only effective treatment for a serious condition like GID.”164 Though
conceptualizing trans experience as a mental illness is problematic, pro-
viding effective care for members of the trans community who require
medical attention is crucial to preventing harm and protecting dignity.
In sum, many transgender people have unique healthcare needs.
Some incarcerated transgender people have secured access to trans af-
firming medical treatment by relying on the Eighth Amendment’s prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment.165 However, not all
plaintiffs are able to satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s requirements.166
Further, even successful cases are subject to practical and ideological
limitations. First, many “improved” prison policies fail to accommodate
the diversity of the transgender community, especially vulnerable trans-
gender inmates.167 Second, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence relies on a
medicalized conception of the binary system of gender. The legal com-
munity should explore alternate legal grounds that would permit trans
159 See Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 555–56 (7th Cir. 2011).
160 Id.
161 See Coleman, supra note 88 at 54–55. In 2010, the United States Tax Court held that
the costs of HRT and GCS are, for certain individuals, tax deductible as forms of necessary
medical care, rather than nondeductible expenses for cosmetic treatment. See O’Donnabhain v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue,134 T.C. 34, 70, 76–77 (U.S. Tax Ct. 2010).
162 See Coleman, supra note 88, at 54–55.
163 Id. at 68.
164 Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir. 2011).
165 See, e.g., Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
166 See, e.g., Moritsugu, 222 F.3d at 106.
167 See, e.g., NCLR, supra note 62.
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people to assert an affirmative right to gender expression independent of
the right to medical care.
D. Sexual Violence
Another issue that incarcerated transgender people face is increased
risk of violence. Transgender people are often uniquely vulnerable to
physical attacks, harassment, and sexual assault.168 Indeed, incarcerated
transgender people are nine-to-ten times more likely than the general in-
carcerated population to be sexually assaulted by another inmate, and
five to six times more likely to be sexually assaulted by facility staff.169
There are several explanations for this phenomenon. First, wide-
spread transphobia and subscription to the binary system of gender can
subject transgender people to ridicule and abuse outside the prison con-
text.170 Within prisons, reduced privacy and power dynamics can exacer-
bate this issue—especially for transgender women housed in male
facilities.171 Prison environments of hyper-masculine control and domi-
nance contribute to high rates of sexual assault against feminine, young,
and new prisoners.172 Second, prison employees often lack the proper
training required to be aware of the needs of incarcerated transgender
individuals.173 Worse, staff can contribute to the problem, either by in-
flicting abuse upon transgender individuals themselves, or ‘looking the
other way’ when such violence takes place.174
Like plaintiffs discussed in the previous section on healthcare, some
incarcerated transgender people have successfully addressed sexual vio-
lence through reliance on the Eighth Amendment.175 Specifically, such
plaintiffs have argued that staff failure to protect transgender inmates
from abuse constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.176 However, un-
like Eighth Amendment violations of indifference to medical need,
Eighth Amendment violations of indifference to safety do not require
transgender people to conceptualize themselves as disordered. Instead,
168 See JAILHOUSE, supra note 82.
169 See NCTE, supra note 70, at 192.
170 HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Understanding the Transgender Community (2018) https:/
/www.hrc.org/resources/understanding-the-transgender-community (“While the visibility of
transgender people is increasing in popular culture and daily life, we still face severe discrimi-
nation, stigma and systemic inequality.”).
171 Valerie Jenness et al., Violence in California Correctional Facilities: An Empirical
Examination of Sexual Assault (2007), http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/pdf/FINAL_PREA
_REPORT.pdf.
172 Id.
173 See JAILHOUSE, supra note 82.
174 Id.
175 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
176 Id.
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plaintiffs must first show she faced “substantial risk of serious harm.”177
Then, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant acted with “deliber-
ate indifference” to that substantial risk.178
For example, in Farmer v. Brennan, a transgender woman success-
fully argued that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm when they failed to protect her from re-
peated sexual assaults during her incarceration.179 In that case, plaintiff
Dee Farmer was placed in a men’s facility where she was repeatedly
beaten and raped.180 The court concluded that the prison officials vio-
lated Farmer’s Eighth Amendment rights because they knew about the
attacks but did not take preventative or punitive action.181
Farmer v. Brennan was significant because it provided incarcerated
transgender people precedent to argue that failure to protect them from
sexual assault constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. However, not
all Eighth Amendment plaintiffs are so successful.182 This is in part be-
cause the standard for establishing that a prison official possessed the
requisite knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm varies. Typically,
documented history of attack and harassment against an individual are
sufficient to establish awareness of a risk.183 However, some courts have
gone so far as to say mere awareness of plaintiff’s status as transgender
is sufficient to put staff on notice that she is at substantial risk of serious
harm.184 Indeed, PREA lists transgender people within the category of
“potentially vulnerable prisoners” that deserve special attention and mon-
itoring.185 However, other courts set the requisite knowledge standard
much higher. For instance, in D.B. v. Orange County, a Florida district
court found that a transgender woman who had undergone surgical pro-
cedures altering her appearance and was placed with a male cellmate and
raped by him, had not shown that prison officials were aware of the
heightened risk of sexual assault against transgender prisoners.186
177 Id. at 825.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 829.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 841.
182 See, e.g., D.B. v. Orange County, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130993, *17 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 18, 2014).
183 See JAILHOUSE, supra note 82.
184 Green v. Hooks, 6:13-cv-17, 2013 WL 4647493, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug 29, 2013) (find-
ing allegations that defendants were aware that transgender plaintiff feared for her life and that
“prison is dangerous for transgender inmates” constituted deliberate indifference); See Lojan v.
Crumbsie, 12 CV. 0320 LAP, 2013 WL 411356, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2013) (holding mere
knowledge that plaintiff was transgender was sufficient to put prison officials on notice that
she was susceptible to physical attack).
185 28 C.F.R. § 115.
186 D.B. v. Orange County, 2014 WL 4674136, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2014) (finding
insufficient evidence that County was on notice that it needed to take additional measures to
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Similarly, there is no clear standard regarding what actions defend-
ants must to take to abate serious risks. For instance, if a guard takes any
action, like writing up the matter or processing a complaint, the court
might say the guard did not disregard the risk to safety.187 For instance,
in Johnson v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit held that an officer who “re-
ferred the matter for further investigation” may have done enough to es-
cape liability for a gay individual who was forced into sexual servitude
by a prison gang.188
Additionally, courts vary regarding which forms of gendered abuse
constitute “serious harms.” Though protection from rape comes within
the scope of the Eighth Amendment, protection from sexual harassment
and psychological abuse can be more difficult to litigate. For example, in
Murray v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, the Sixth Circuit dismissed a trans-
gender woman’s claim regarding a series of harassing comments about
her bodily appearance and presumed sexual orientation.189 The court
concluded that verbal abuse alone does not rise to the level of “unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain” necessary for an Eighth Amendment
violation.190 However, in Schwenk v. Hartford, the Ninth Circuit allowed
a transgender woman to make an Eighth Amendment claim alleging that
a guard grinded his exposed penis into her buttocks after she refused his
demand for oral sex.191 Whether an incident of unwanted sexual touching
will suffice as a “serious harm” will depend on the circuit, the intensity
of the touching, and whether it was a single or repeated incident.192
To summarize, incarcerated people of trans experience face an in-
creased risk of sexual violence.193 Some courts have addressed this risk
by establishing that staff failures to protect transgender individuals from
sexual violence constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.194 Such “in-
difference to safety” violations are not subject to the same ideological
risks that “indifference to medical need” violations are, because “indif-
ference to safety” claims do not require plaintiffs to conceptualize them-
selves as disordered. Nevertheless, “indifference to safety” jurisprudence
is still subject to several limitations, including lack of a clear standard
regarding knowledge of risk, disregard of risk, and seriousness of harm.
protect transgender inmates because there was no evidence of other sexual assaults against
transgender inmates at Orange County Jail).
187 See JAILHOUSE, supra note 82.
188 Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004).
189 Murray v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997).
190 Id.
191 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F. 3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
192 See JAILHOUSE, supra note 82.
193 Id.
194 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (U.S. 1994).
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Such limitations reflect societal disregard for the issues trans people
face. Courts should impose a clear, consistent duty on prison officials to
protect transgender people from all forms of gendered abuse, including
transphobic slurs and sexual harassment. Further, the legal system should
acknowledge that such abuse is partially the product of widespread
transphobia. Courts have the capacity to play a more proactive role in
preventing trans oppression by conceptualizing transgender identities as
legitimate, rather than indicative of mental illness.
E. Solitary Confinement
Another issue that incarcerated transgender people face is involun-
tary placement in solitary confinement. Indeed, 85 percent of LGBTQ
people behind bars report spending time in solitary confinement.195
Often, transgender people are placed in solitary as a form of “protective
custody.”196 Admittedly, trans inmates do face a heightened risk of vio-
lence when housed among the general prison population, especially if
they are housed in a facility that does not correspond to their gender
identity.197 However, responding to this concern by placing trans people
in solitary has perverse consequences in that it punishes victims of vio-
lence and deters reporting of abuse.198 Further, “safety concern” rhetoric
can be pretext for transphobia. For instance, trans individuals are often
written up for minor infractions—such as failing to conform to prison
dress code—and then land in solitary due to staff prejudice.199
The impact of placing trans individuals in solitary confinement is
more punitive than protective. First, segregated individuals face limited
access to educational classes, employment opportunities, and other recre-
ational programs.200 Second, segregated housing does nothing to protect
individuals from staff abuse.201 In fact, segregated housing may increase
risk of staff abuse, due to decreased visibility and oversight in isolated
units.202 Finally, the devastating psychological effect of solitary confine-
195 Jason Lydon et al., Coming Out of Concrete Closets: A Report on Black & Pink’s
National LGBTQ Prisoner Survey at 5 (2015), http://www.blackandpink.org/wp-content/
upLoads/Coming-Out-of-Concrete-Closets.-Black-and-Pink.-October-21-2015.pdf.
196 Gabriel Akers, Safety and Solidarity Across Gender Lines: Rethinking Segregation of
Transgender People in Detention, 9 DUKEMINIER AWARDS J. 343, 374 (2009).
197 See JAILHOUSE, supra note 82; see Jenness, supra note 172.
198 Faroat Andasheva, Aren’t I A Woman? Deconstructing Sex Discrimination and Free-
ing Transgender Women from Solitary Confinement, 12 FIU L. REV. 117, 126 (2016).
199 See Akers, supra note 196.
200 NCLR, supra note 62.
201 See UNJUST, supra note 92.
202 Id.
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ment is well-documented.203 Among other symptoms, individuals in iso-
lation can experience “extreme anxiety, hallucinations, violent fantasies,
and hypersensitivity to external stimuli.”204 Consequently, individuals in
segregation are more likely to inflict self-harm or attempt suicide.205
Despite the adverse effects of isolation, however, courts do not al-
ways view solitary confinement as a form of cruel and unusual punish-
ment.206 Rather, courts have established that in a prison context, even
serious deprivations can be permissible when accompanied by adequate
disciplinary or safety justifications.207 For instance, in DiMarco v. Wyo-
ming Dept. of Corrections, a district court held that a prison did not vio-
late an intersex woman’s Eighth Amendment rights even though she was
isolated in the most restrictive setting of the prison for fourteen
months.208 DiMarco had the lowest possible security classification, and
was isolated only because of her physical characteristics.209 The court
explained that it “reluctantly” rejected the Eighth Amendment portion of
DiMarco’s claim because the United States Supreme Court set the bar so
high for cruel and unusual punishment that the facts of DiMarco’s case
did not qualify.210 The court noted that despite being housed in a setting
typically reserved for the most dangerous inmates for her entire incarcer-
ation, DiMarco did not endure cruel and unusual punishment because she
was housed in sanitary conditions, received three meals a day, was not
deprived of sleep or exercise, and was not physically assaulted.211 The
Tenth Circuit later affirmed the district court’s decision.212 In essence,
the Eighth Amendment only applies in cases of physical torture of pris-
oners, extreme deprivations of necessities of life, and deliberate indiffer-
ence to “serious medical needs” or “substantial risks of serious harm.”
As such, it is difficult for individuals to rely on Eighth Amendment pro-
tections when challenging the legality of involuntary placement in soli-
tary confinement.
However, incarcerated individuals may be entitled to procedural due
process before being placed in solitary confinement. The Fourteenth
Amendment provides, “no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
203 Tracy Hresko, In the Cellars of the Hollow Men: Use of Solitary Confinement in U.S.
Prisons and its Implications Under International Laws Against Torture, 18 PACE INT’L L.
REV. 1, 3 (2006).
204 Id. at 7.
205 See UNJUST, supra note 92, at 92.
206 See Andasheva, supra note 199.
207 Id.
208 DiMarco v. Wyoming Dep’t of Corr., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Wyo. 2004).
209 Id. at 1188.
210 Id. at 1194.
211 Id.
212 DiMarco v. Wyoming Dep’t of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 2007).
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or property, without due process of law.”213 The Supreme Court has held
that a protected liberty interest may arise from prison placement deci-
sions and conditions of confinement.214 To determine whether a pro-
tected liberty interest exists, courts evaluate the nature of placement
conditions “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”215 If a
protected liberty is established, courts determine whether that interest
was afforded sufficient due process protection by considering three fac-
tors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) both the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s in-
terest, including the burdens additional safeguards would entail.216
Some individuals have brought suit arguing that isolation based on
their transgender status constitutes deprivation of a liberty interest with-
out due process. Such arguments have been met with mixed results. Un-
fortunately, some courts have concluded that inmates do not have a
protected liberty interest in being classified a certain way within a facil-
ity,217 and others have concluded that inmates do have a protected liberty
interest, but prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity.218
Nevertheless, in DiMarco v. Wyoming Dept. of Corrections, the dis-
trict court concluded that the prison violated DiMarco’s due process
rights when she was held in dungeon-like, high-security lock-up without
any opportunity for a hearing to challenge that placement.219 The court
first concluded that she had a liberty interest that required due process
protection because DiMarco’s placement in solitary confinement for 438
days constituted an atypical and significant departure from ordinary inci-
dents of prison life.220 The court reiterated that DiMarco did not violate
prison rules—her confinement was only due to physical characteristics
which she did not choose.221 The court further concluded that DiMarco
did not receive adequate due process protection of this liberty interest
213 U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
214 DiMarco 2004, 300 F. Supp. at 1340.
215 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005).
216 Id. at 224–25.
217 See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 215, see also, Long v. Nix, 877 F. Supp. 1358, 1366–67
(S.D. Idaho 1995) aff’d, 86 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that an incarcerated transgender
person had no property or liberty interest in being classified in a particular way or placed in a
particular facility); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a trans-
gender woman who challenged placement in administrative segregation did not have a due
process claim because no liberty interest was at stake).
218 See generally Farmer v. Kavanaugh, 494 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D. Md. 2007) (finding that
a transgender inmate had a liberty interest in avoiding transfer from a maximum security to a
super-max facility, but prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourteenth
Amendment claim).
219 DiMarco 2004, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
220 Id. at 1195.
221 Id.
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because she was not allowed to voice her thoughts and concerns prior to
the prison’s final decision to place her in solitary confinement.222 The
court described the prison’s decision as “completely arbitrary and capri-
cious and without a rational basis,” and emphasized that the prison “had
plenty of time to develop other more respectable, less harsh
alternatives.”223
However, the Tenth Circuit later reversed the district court’s deci-
sion.224 The court first concluded that DiMarco did not have a liberty
interest in her placement and the conditions of her confinement because
DiMarco had access to the “ordinary essentials” of prison life, such as
medical care.225 As such, the conditions of her confinement did not im-
pose such atypical and significant hardship as to violate due process
right.226 The court further concluded that even if DiMarco had a pro-
tected liberty interest, the prison provided adequate procedural protec-
tions to justify its placement decision.227 The court noted that prison
officials consulted doctors and had “legitimate safety concerns” when
they made their placement decision,228 and DiMarco had the chance to
be heard as a review of her placement every ninety days.229
Therefore, like the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment
has done little to protect transgender people from arbitrary and unfair
placement in solitary confinement. However, a procedural due process
approach is worth further exploration because due process claims are
consistent with a self-definition model of gender. Through the recogni-
tion of a procedural due process right, a transgender person is permitted
to assert her own identity, on her own terms, and argue that infringing on
her protected liberty interests in a discriminatory way is unconstitutional.
Rather than conceptualize their gender identity as a psychological disor-
der, transgender plaintiffs are thus able to discuss gender in an inclusive
and affirming manner. A substantive due process approach is worth ex-
ploration as well. Through substantive due process claims, plaintiffs
could assert that the right to self-define gender is fundamental. Classify-
ing gender identity as a fundamental right aligns with other due process
jurisprudence; among other rights, the Supreme Court considers the right
to marry, reproduce, refuse medical treatment, and direct child-rearing as
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 DiMarco 2007, 473 F.3d at 1334.
225 Id. at 1342.
226 Id. at 1343.
227 Id. at 1344.
228 Id. at 1338 (“institutional safety concerns created by [p]lacing an inmate of the oppo-
site gender in [the facility]. . . mandated separate housing.”).
229 Id. 1337.
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fundamental.230 A right to self-define gender fits within this framework
of protecting liberty and privacy.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may
also provide protection for transgender individuals placed in solitary con-
finement. However, lawsuits brought under the Fourteenth Amendment
have been largely unsuccessful.231 Courts do not recognize transgender
people as a suspect class.232 Consequently, their claims are analyzed
under rational basis review. Under this standard, prisons only need to
establish that segregation was “rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment interest” to overcome an equal protection challenge.233 Prison offi-
cials can easily meet this standard by citing security concerns.234 For
instance, in the DiMarco case, the district court dismissed DiMarco’s
Equal Protection claim because the prison official’s decision was ration-
ally related to the legitimate interest of ensuring the safety of the general
prison population.235
Incarcerated transgender people might have more success pursuing
Equal Protection claims if transgender people were recognized as a “sus-
pect” or “quasi-suspect” class because then their claims would be subject
to strict or intermediate scrutiny.236 Transgender plaintiffs have had
some success achieving heightened scrutiny outside the prison context.
For instance, in Glenn v. Brumby, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed employ-
ment discrimination against a transgender woman under intermediate
scrutiny, holding that discrimination based on gender non-conformity
constitutes sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.237 In its
analysis, the court relied on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which estab-
230 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (upholding a right to privacy
regarding consensual homosexual activity), Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (uphold-
ing a right to direct child rearing), Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990) (upholding a right to refuse medical treatment), Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)
(upholding a right to marry in prison settings), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding a
right to privacy regarding abortion), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (upholding a
right to family planning and contraceptive choice), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(upholding a right to marry regarding race), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(upholding a right to marital privacy).
231 See Lopez v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. (NRB) 10321, 2009 WL 229956
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009); Kaeo-Tomaselli v. Butts, No. 11-00670 LEK/BMK, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13280 (D. Haw. Jan. 31, 2013); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987).
232 See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F. 2d 659, 667 (9th Cir. 1977).
233 DiMarco 2007, 473 F.3d at 1338.
234 See Lopez, 2009 WL 229956.
235 DiMarco 2007, 473 F.3d at 1338 (“institutional safety concerns created by [p]lacing
an inmate of the opposite gender in [the facility] . . . mandated separate housing.”).
236 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (finding that gender is a quasi-
suspect class and gender classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny); see also Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (finding that race is a suspect class and racial
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny).
237 Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011).
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lished that discrimination based on gender stereotypes is sex-based
discrimination.238
Sex-discrimination claims are an important source of progress be-
cause they are consistent with a self-definition model of gender. Such
claims permit plaintiffs to validate their gender identity as legitimate by
arguing that discriminating against people whose gender identity does
not match their sex assigned at birth is a form of gender discrimination.
In short, plaintiffs can argue that transgender discrimination is gender
discrimination, effectively asserting a right to self-define gender without
implicating transgender identity as a mental disorder. In practice, how-
ever, such claims do not have as progressive of a socio-political impact.
The popular interpretation of Price Waterhouse forces plaintiffs to file
claims as a man or woman whose appearance does not match her biologi-
cal sex, rather than as a transgender person who is facing discrimination
for expressing her legitimate gender. In other words, plaintiffs must ar-
gue that they are being discriminated against for their “gender noncon-
forming appearance,” rather than their transgender identity, which
disregards a self-definition model of gender.
Another potential source of progress is the PREA guidelines. PREA
prevents prison staff from placing individuals in administrative segrega-
tion against their will, unless they have found—within the first twenty-
four hours of involuntary segregation—that there is no other way to keep
the individual safe.239 Positively, these guidelines are designed to reduce
the arbitrary and discriminatory use of solitary confinement against trans
people.240 However, as previously noted, using solitary to address safety
concerns has perverse effects, such as punishing victims and deterring
reporting of abuse.241 Further, as discussed in the earlier section on hous-
ing classifications, PREA’s function is more expressive than practical
because it does not provide individuals with a private right of action.242
To summarize, incarcerated transgender people are often placed in
solitary confinement against their will, either for protective or punitive
purposes.243 Solitary confinement has an adverse impact on human phys-
ical, emotional, and psychological wellbeing.244 Transgender people
have contested discriminatory use of solitary confinement by relying on
the Eighth Amendment, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection
clause, but have had difficulty securing adequate legal protection on any
238 See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
239 28 C.F.R. § 115.
240 See Shay, supra note 104 (“PREA represents an unprecedented national reformist ef-
fort in corrections regulation.”).
241 See Andasheva, supra note 199.
242 See Arkles, supra note 102.
243 See Lydon, supra note 196.
244 See Hresko, supra note 204.
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of the three grounds. To address this issue effectively, courts and prisons
must punish perpetrators of inmate abuse rather than victims, and take
seriously the devastating impact of solitary confinement. Moreover,
courts and prisons must acknowledge the importance of respecting a self-
definition model of gender in designing housing classification systems.
CONCLUSION
As well as the issues faced by all human beings caught in the matrix
of the prison-industrial complex, incarcerated transgender people endure
myriad additional struggles. These struggles include incorrect housing
designations, limited healthcare access, sexual violence, and discrimina-
tory use of solitary confinement. Although there are some legal protec-
tions for people who are transgender and incarcerated, much of the
limited progress that has been made relies on stigmatizing, misguided
assumptions regarding sex and gender. To effectively and comprehen-
sively protect the rights of people who are transgender and incarcerated,
courts and prisons must move beyond transphobia and cisnormativity,
and instead honor the dignity and autonomy of people of all genders.
Eradicating cissexism from the prison system mandates social and
legal reformulation of our conceptualization of gender. We must question
gender categories themselves if we are to fully respect the rights and
interests of all people. To ensure that transgender people will be treated
fairly in society and in the courtroom, we must make space for people to
construct their gender identity on their own terms, and recognize all gen-
ders as healthy, legitimate, and worthy of recognition and respect.
